It’s preposterous. There’s no problem that’s getting addressed with this solution, this is a solution in search of some problem.
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Department of Defense
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Increase the Air Force budget by 5 percent annually (after adjusting for inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force.
Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air Force’s acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in
production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat
near-term to mid-term threats.
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Increase F-35A procurement to 60-80 per year.
Build the capacity for a B-21 production rate of 15-18 aircraft per year along with applicable elements of the B-21 long-range strike family of systems.
Increase Air Force airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile combat employment operations that generate combat sorties froma highly dispersed posture in both Europe and the Pacific.
Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50 nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth aircraft flying in contested environments against target sets that could exceed 100,000 aimpoints.
Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China’s nuclear modernization breakout.
Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum.
Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts. Increasingly capable
adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory against those adversaries.
Attain an operationally optimized advanced battle management system as the Air Force element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control enterprise.
Produce the next-generation air dominance system of systems (air
moving target indication, other sensors, communications, command and control, weapons, and uninhabited aerial vehicles).
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3. Achieve moving target engagement capability and capacity against sea, surface, and ground mobile targets at the scale necessary to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy.
4. Build resilient basing, sustainment, and communications for survivability in a contested environment.
5. Establish a vigorous and sufficiently funded electromagnetic spectrum operations recovery plan to make up for more than 20 years of neglect of this mission area.
U.S. MARINE CORPS
The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is the maritime land force of the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy. It serves a critical role as an expeditionary amphibious force that can project power from sea to shore and beyond while performing other specialized missions like securing America’s diplomatic outposts abroad.
Between the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the conclusion of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in August 2022, the Marine Corps engaged in extended operations ashore as directed by the Secretary of Defense, leaving it with little opportunity or ability to train for and execute the naval and amphibious operations for which it is uniquely suited and directed by law. This lengthy divergence from its primary mission led to deep concern that the Corps had become a
“second land army,” prompting senior Marine Corps leaders to push for the service to return to the sea. In addition, the USMC spent nearly two decades fighting counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and developed capabilities that were specifically geared to those fights but have limited utility in scenarios involving evenly matched and advanced enemies or amphibious operations that are necessary for the projection of naval power.
As aresult, Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger developed and began to implement Force Design 2030," a plan that, if completed, would be the most radical transformation of the Marine Corps since World War II. The successful implementation of this force redesign, coupled with reforms in the Marine Corps’ personnel system and the Navy’s amphibious shipbuilding plans, will be critical to ensuring the Corps’ future combat effectiveness.
Needed Reforms
• Divest systems to implement the Force Design 2030 transformation.” Divesting equipment that is less relevant to distributed, low-signature operations in a contested maritime environment will make funds available for modernization.