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numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing treaties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For

example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered

sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political

leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic

capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security.

At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to negotiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned.

The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles treaties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or international agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources.

The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public meaning of the Constitution,°® and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consideration for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and submission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agencies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely

coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons.

Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes productive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the