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Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities

to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged

US. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware.

In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.”°

The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not

stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”?’ The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines.

These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others

to establish a presidentially directed and durable US. foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure

the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her

vision for the nation’s role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen

dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department

can contribute to this objective.

In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests

and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.