Page 119

Alter the Space Development Agency’s current “fail-early” approach and transition to a methodology that maintains aggressive timelines but with significantly greater engineering rigor, with special attention to sustainment, support, and fully integrated space operations.

Increase the number of general officer positions to ensure the Space Force’s ability to compete for resources on acommon basis with the other services.

Explore creation of a Space Force Academy to attract top aero-astro students, engineers, and scientists and develop astronauts. The academy could be attached initially to a large existing research university like

the California Institute of Technology or MIT, share faculty and funding, and eventually be built separately to be on par with the other service academies.

U.S. CYBER COMMAND

USCYBERCOM was established in 2010 by the Department of Defense to unify

the direction of cyberspace operations, strengthen DOD cyberspace capabilities,

and integrate and enhance U.S. cyber expertise. Cyber capabilities and threats are

evolving rapidly. Accordingly, a conservative Administration should be especially

sensitive to and prepared to meet the challenges presented by bureaucratic silos,

inappropriately rigid tactical doctrine, and strategic thinking’s historic tendency

to lag behind technological capability.

The preliminary evidence from the war in Ukraine suggests that existing cyber

doctrine and certain capability and target assumptions may be incorrect or mis

placed. The following recommendations therefore presuppose that there will be

a rigorous “lessons learned” analysis and review of existing U.S. doctrine in light of the battlefield evidence.

Needed Reforms

Ensure that USCYBERCOM is properly focused. Mission creep

is leading to wasteful overlap with the Department of Homeland Security, National Security Agency, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency.

Separate USCYBERCOM from the National Security Agency per congressional direction.

Conduct effective offensive cyber-effects operations at the tactical and strategic levels.

—119 —

3

4

Expand defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President Trump’s classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, “United States Cyber Operations Policy.”*° End USCYBERCOM'’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify” USS. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics.

• Increase USCYBERCOWM’s effectiveness.

Accelerate the integration of cyber and electronic warfare (EW) doctrine and capabilities, abiding by the time-tested norms of combined-arms warfare.

Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers, aircrew, and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level.

Break the paradigm of cyber authorities held at the strategic level.

Increase cyber resilience by, for example, protecting the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air Force’s Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS).

Expand coordination of joint operations with allies.

Implement the Government Accountability Office’s recommendation that the DOD Chief Information Officer, Commander of USCYBERCOM, and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters-DOD Information Network “align policy and system requirements to enable DOD to have enterprise-wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical, strategic, and military strategies for response.”*”

• Rationalize strategy and doctrine.

2

Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes.

Apply traditional deterrence strategies and principles for using cyber/

EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/or EW actions against US. infrastructure and citizens.