This is a common theme in Republican administrations dating back to presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. What you do is you break the government, make it very hard for the government to function, and then you loudly announce that the government can’t do anything.
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Intelligence Community
• Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets,
• Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures,
• Anexpress prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and
• Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act.
CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES
The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear.
A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC leaders will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include:
• What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition?
• How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?